Virtual Parallels
Armenia and Azerbaijan between Iran, Turkey and Russia
Armenia and Azerbaijan between Iran, Turkey and Russia
For Turkey the War in Iran Is an Opportunity to Raise Its Importance in the Eyes of the US
- What kind of relations between Armenia and Russia can you envisage in Putin’s second term in office?
-Everything will depend on what kind of choice Putin himself will make. In my opinion, the results of the latest Parliamentary and Presidential elections in Russia have been more than handy for the American and British tandem, for as a consequence to the situation in Russia its further rapprochement to the French and German nucleus of the EU will hardly be able to come forth in a configuration, threatening to the strategic partnership. Russia is freely floating in the “wild waters” of the Eurasian space. For Anglo-Saxons, and at this moment also for the whole of the EU Russia must remain a physically strong state, which is still weak spiritually and intellectually and underdeveloped economically and legally, a state which will not try to reach up to the Western standards. However, at the instigation of the latter and if necessary, it may stand any military confrontation with China (of course, if there is any such need in initiating such a confrontation). Thus, Putin has to make a choice – to play his role which he has already and partially got used to, or to find another niche for Russia, which will enable it to take a breath, to acquire a firm and competitive base for an outlook for further advance and progress without conflicts. The idea of a Eurasian Union is being actively promoted does not at all solve this problem and completely fits in with Western scenarios. The fate of South Caucasus, which also includes Armenia, will largely depend on the choice for progression Russia makes for itself.
- What can radically change the strategic significance of the Karabakh status quo for Russia and other OSCE Minsk group co-chairing countries? May Putin prefer a different policy in the Karabakh issue?
Within the logic of the policy Russia has been leading since 1992, the strategic presence of Russia in the whole territory of South Caucasus has been set as an objective. After the loss of Georgian territory, brought about by the abrupt change of that country’s policy under President Saakashvili, the price of re-establishing its political and military presence in Azerbaijan rose for Russia. As a compensation for this presence, Russia is considering the possibility for passing part of the territories of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic to Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijan’s refusal in case Russia fails to find new globally political solutions, will contribute to the preservation of the existing status quo by Russia. The policy led by the USA, France and the EU rather contributes to a situation in which Azerbaijan will not accept the Russian scheme of resolution, which also means the preservation of the status quo for now.
-To what consequences can the further escalation of the conflict around Iran lead to for the Armenian party and especially in case a war breaks out? Are there any signs of the influence of the Iranian crisis on Armenia?
- If the Western community, Turkey and Israel make a decision on the reasonability of commencing hostilities against Iran, this may lead to a global violation of the still existent relative geopolitical balance in the Eurasian continent. I think that in case things develop in this manner, Iran will be strategically interested in causing minimum problems for its adversaries and to enlarge the area of military actions, activating various armed conflicts in the territory of Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, Lebanon, Sudan, Egypt and so on. Azerbaijan will become a zone Iran will pay special attention to, for it will become a potential springboard for attacks on Iran from the North. The least that Russia and China will be able to do for Iran is to keep positive neutrality. Among other things this also means that Russia will be able to insist on the nonparticipation of Armenia in the hostilities against Iran. And though the Iranian crisis has not yet been visibly reflected onto the life of our country, Armenia and Artsakh need to be prepared for a compelled limited or large-scale military operations, related to the probable armed conflict between Azerbaijan and Iran. In any case the war in Iran will become a terrible ordeal for all the peoples in the region.
- What attitude to the issue of striking Iran is there in Russia and Turkey? How realistic is such a strike today and how may Russia and Turkey behave in this situation?
- An effective and destructive strike on Iran will undoubtedly lead to the weakening of Russia’s positions in South Caucasus and Central Asia. The interests of Russia will be obviously damaged both politically and materially. That is why I believe that Russia will do everything possible in order to prevent the realization of the military scenario against Iran. For Turkey the war in Iran, along with some risks (the intensification of the Kurdish factor, the appearance of refugees and so on) may also contain some positive prospects in terms of increasing its own influence in South Caucasus and in the territory of Northern Iran with expansion into Central Asia. For Turkey the war in Iran will become a good occasion to raise its own importance in the eyes of the USA as well as its other currently open and secret friends once again. And if Russia preserves at least positive neutrality towards Iran, Turkey may, to a certain degree, participate in the military actions against Iran, hoping for various political and specifically material preferences.
Azerbaijan Is Being Extremely Cautious
- What kind of relations between Armenia and Russia can you envisage in Putin’s second term in office?
- I assume that these relations will not undergo any serious modifications. It should be borne in mind that it was with Vladimir Putin’s coming to power that the feelings of estrangement were overcome in the relations between Russia and Azerbaijan and a positive breakthrough took place in the late 1990s.
Hence, personal contacts between Aliyev and Putin have been established for a long time now and I assume that they have managed to keep these personal relations in the mutually respectful format. There is no antagonism between the two states today. Officially, Azerbaijan and Russia are strategic partners. The volumes of mutual trade are growing. The traditional humanitarian cooperation has been maintained at a high level. Recently, taking into consideration the increasing influence of Baku in international politics, the level of diplomatic dialogue and interaction has been raised due to its membership to the UN Security Council. The parties are closely cooperating in suppressing and neutralizing terroristic threats and religious extremism in the Caucasus.
Military and technical cooperation has become a new element in the relations between Moscow and Baku. Azerbaijan is probably Russia’s number one customer by the volumes of its military procurements and its solvent partner from among CIS countries. Last year Russia provided us with two divisions of modern Antimissile S-300 Favorite system. Currently, the procurement of a large stock of M-35 helicopters, modern armored machines and so on is going on. In a word, the relations between Russia and Azerbaijan are stable and are ascending.
This does not mean that the relations between our countries are trouble-free. The discussions on the issue of prolonging the rental of the Russian radar station in Gabala are in progress. The approaches of the parties are cardinally divergent in the issue of Transcaspian pipelines. Finally, Baku is not absolutely happy with Russia’s position in the issue of Karabakh resolution.
I assume that the policy led independently by Azerbaijan, the unwillingness of our country to adhere to any political and economic structures designed by Moscow (Common Economic Space, Customs Union, Eurasian Union) is not to Moscow’s liking. But the Russian leadership will have to take the growing power and self-confidence of Baku into account. Not only Russia, but Azerbaijan, too, has become stronger in the last decade.
- What can radically change the strategic significance of the Karabakh status quo for Russia and other OSCE Minsk group co-chairing countries? May Putin prefer a different policy in the Karabakh issue?
- In the issue of the resolution of the Karabakh conflict the interests of the co-chairing countries converge only in the point that they will not allow the renewal of military actions. With regard to all the other issues, every mediating country wishes to see a resolution which will closely attach both Azerbaijan and Armenia to it. In this regard the Western countries are promoting European integration as a large-scale format within which they are trying to dissolve the Karabakh issue. Russia can correspondingly alter its policy with regard to the Karabakh conflict towards a better understanding of Baku’s position in exchange for the preparedness of Azerbaijan to fully return into the sphere of Moscow’s influence. Armenia seems to be firmly attached to Russia.
This is not acceptable for Azerbaijan, since our priority partners – Turkey and Georgia, through which all our export pipelines and transportation communication lie – remain beyond the economic and political alliances, constructed by Moscow. Besides, there is no confidence that the compromises Russia may pull out from Armenia in the issue of Karabakh resolution, are worth to voluntarily agree to the role of Moscow’s vassal.
-To what consequences can the further escalation of the conflict around Iran lead to for the Armenian party and especially in case a war breaks out? Are there any signs of the influence of the Iranian crisis on Armenia?
- A lot has been said about such a negative turn of things. This includes both the probable inflow of refugees and environmental consequences. Quite probably, the communication routes both for the delivery of freight from Bandarabad port in the Persian Gulf and transit into Nakhijevan via Iran will be destroyed. Not mentioning the possibility of the cornered Islamic regime, irrationally striking all over the place wherever their military machine can reach. Tehran is not capable of doing significant harm to Israel and the USA. That is why Iran is threatening to block the Strait of Hormuz 40 percent of global oil exports pass through, to strike at the objects and terminals of oil extraction in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Qatar and so on. Among Iran’s potential targets the objects of Azerbaijani oil production infrastructure are also mentioned. Regardless of repeated assurances that no military activities against Iran will be allowed from the territory of our country, Tehran expresses its mistrust and makes quite explicit threats.
The relations between Azerbaijan and Iran leave much to be desired and are far from being good-neighborly. We have to undertake extra measures in order to ensure the security of our economic and civilian objects from hostilities, first of all by air and in the sea. At the same time we closely coordinate our positions with our strategic, military and political partner – Turkey. It is not accidental that against the background of the dramatic aggravation of relations with Iran, a number of commanders of various troops from Turkey arrive in Baku in order to coordinate the actions in the sphere of security. Tehran is well aware that in case of hostilities against Azerbaijan, it will have to face not only the West, but also Turkey, Pakistan and even Russia.
- What attitude to the issue of striking Iran is there in Russia and Turkey? How realistic is such a strike today and how may Russia and Turkey behave in this situation?
- Both Russia and Turkey are on their guard against military strikes at Iran. Azerbaijan shares this position. However, in case Israel and the USA decide on bombarding the nuclear objects in Iran, I assume that neither Russia, nor Turkey will support Iran by getting involved in the armed conflict. They will confine their actions to protests only. Moscow has made it explicit that in this case it will try to restore its military control over South Caucasus. They have voiced plans on “opening up a corridor” across Georgia in order to ensure communication with the Russian military base in Armenia. It is not excluded that some military cooperation may be requested from Azerbaijan, too (placing airfields at Russia’s disposal, providing waters for mooring warships and others). It is specifically the neutralization of such risks and threats both from the South and the North that should make us extremely cautious in the issue of Iran and compel us to harmonize our actions with Turkey and Pakistan, just as we are doing it now.
Bulletins
Cooperation between the EU and EaP States 10 Years Later: What Lies Ahead?
Russia and the South Caucasus: Agendas, Priorities and Realities-2019
